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Human rights is the cosmopolitan idea. Whilst constitutional rights can be justified by 
reference to the fact of co-membership in a bounded political community, borders are 
irrelevant in the recognition of human rights, which give expression to the equal moral 
worth of all individuals.1 The problem for human rights is that they lack a coherent or agreed 
ontological foundation. The contemporary literature divides between naturalistic accounts, 
which conclude that, for some reason or other, we have human rights simply ‘by virtue of 
being human’; political accounts grounded in the practice of global and domestic politics; 
and an emergent literature on the moral justification for positivizing human rights in 
international law. One thing is clear. Where human rights is formulated in terms of A has a 
human right to X against B by virtue of Y, it is difficult to accept that the justificatory element (‘by 
virtue of Y’) might lie in the imposition of one particular philosophical argument, expressed 
in terms of agency, personhood, capacities, etc., or in the experiences of only one part of the 
human population. In the words of Upendra Baxi: human rights should be universal, not 
global, that is, agreed by the subjects of human rights regimes, and not imposed by others.2 
To the extent we agree with the abbé Sieyès, that persons should not be the passive 
beneficiaries of rights, but active citizens, who decide on the content of rights, then mutatis 
mutandis, a ‘citizen of the world’ (Diogenes) should not be the passive beneficiary of human 
rights, but should understand themselves as also being the authors of the global human 
rights regimes. 
 
                                                
1 David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), p. 54. 
2 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 95-6.  
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The objective of this chapter is to consider whether it is possible to justify global human 
rights by reference to an application of Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative democracy to world 
society, given that the relevant community of fate of human rights is the unbounded human 
species. The argument from deliberative democracy is straightforward: those who are to be 
subject to regulatory norms should understand themselves to be the authors of those norms 
– albeit indirectly. Legitimate authority is established where the subjects of regulations 
consent to norms of conduct, with agreement reflecting a reasoned consensus achieved by 
deliberative equals. The work first outlines the argument for deliberative democracy, before 
considering the possibility of applying the model to systems of global governance and of 
developing a deliberative account of human rights. Three approaches can be seen in the 
literature: human rights as globalized constitutional rights (the position advanced by 
Habermas); human rights as global constitutional rights; and human rights as a global ethic 
arrived at through reasoned deliberations. After the ‘death of God’ (Friedrich Nietzsche), the 
idea that, in the counterfactual ideal, a reasoned consensus represents ‘the right thing to do’ 
has proved highly influential in the literature. This consensus literature can, though, be 
contrasted with work that understands human rights as the politics of dissensus, focused on 
disagreement: human rights as the product of outrage and emotion, not reason. The chapter 
examines the implications of this dissensus literature for the possibilities of a deliberative 
account of global human rights, concluding that human rights becomes meaningful primarily 
as an argument against politics.  
 
The deliberative model  
 
Democracy has established itself as the only legitimate form of government at the level of 
the State, but it is not, contrary to population misconception, defined by the practice of 
majoritarianism, i.e. the holding of periodic elections or attempts to achieve a majority in 
support of a policy proposal, although majoritarianism is certainly one aspect of the practice 
of democracy. Democracy is properly understood as an ongoing process of debate, 
deliberation, and decision. In a democratic system, citizens expect that regulatory directives 
will reflect their individual interests and perspectives on an ongoing basis; that the authorities 
will introduce mechanism to establish those interests and preferences; and they will attempt 
to accommodate those interests and perspectives within the regulatory framework – or 
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explain why this is not possible. Jürgen Habermas’ model of deliberative democracy provides 
the intellectual and theoretical justification to support this way of thinking about democracy, 
establishing that, in the counterfactual ideal, political law norms should be agreed all 
subjects. This consensus is achieved via a process of reasoned deliberation in which 
positions are accepted as legitimate only where agreed by those affected by the outcomes in 
discussions in which the only force used is the force of the better argument.3  
 
The conduct of politics in a deliberative democracy differs from that in aggregative models. 
It is not sufficient to put together a majority of self-interested positions in order to establish 
political legitimacy for a policy proposal. Legitimate laws result from effective democratic 
deliberations. In political debate, participants must rely on reasoned arguments if they are to 
convince others of the rightness of their positions. Consequently, the language of politics 
must be orientated towards mutual understanding, as participants vindicate claims by 
reference to reasons that others might accept, and arguments expressed in terms of what is 
equally good for all. When an argument is not accepted, there is a shift from justification to 
discourse, with claims and arguments tested through reasoned deliberation. Where 
consensus is not possible, the relationship shifts again from discourse to bargaining – a 
process in which each participant engages in strategic argumentation. Bargaining is 
permissible to the extent that the process is deliberative and compromises acceptable, in 
principle, to all participants, who may agree for different reasons – in contrast to a discursive 
consensus. 
 
Whilst deliberative democracy provides the counterfactual ideal at the level of the State 
(against which the practice of real-world democracy can be evaluated), Habermas concludes 
that a global deliberative democracy is not possible, as the global public does not have the 
capacity to imagine itself as a voluntary association of free and equal citizens engaged in a 
process of collective will-formation – a variant of the no demos: no democracy thesis.4 The 
focus, then, should be on limited reform of the already existing governance institutions, in 
                                                
3 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg 
(Oxford: Polity, 1996). 
4 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Does the constitutionalization of international law still have a chance?’, in The Divided West (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2006), p. 115. 
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particular the United Nations. Given the lack of (democratic) legitimacy for any global 
institution, the governance functions of this world organization should be limited to 
international peace and security, technical questions of cooperation, and human rights.5  
 
Elsewhere, I have argued, pace Habermas, that the model of deliberative democracy can be 
applied to governance systems beyond the State – albeit imperfectly.6 The analysis divides 
global regulation in two: the inter-State regimes of public international law and the regulatory 
regimes of international organizations and institutions. In relation to the first, the democratic 
legitimacy of inter-State agreements (treaties, conventions, etc.) can be located in the practice 
of deliberative diplomacy, as participants engage in reasoned discussions leading to a 
consensus on the adoption of a formal instrument (consent is the central idea of the 
international law system). The practice of adopting important treaties at international 
conferences or by international assemblies (in particular the General Assembly of the United 
Nations) enhances the democratic legitimacy of global agreements as those States that will be 
subjected to regulatory norms are directly involved in discussions leading to their agreement. 
In relation to global governance by international organizations and institutions, whilst these 
are normally established by inter-State agreements, they invariably more beyond the literal 
scope of their delegated powers to operate autonomously. There is, then, a requirement for 
global regulators to establish their own legitimate political authority, beyond that accorded to 
the relevant constitutive treaty. The argument from deliberative democracy suggests the 
following in relation to the exercise of authority by global regulators. First, the exercise of 
normative power must be justified by reference to the interests and perspectives of the 
subjects of the relevant regime. Second, in order to ascertain the interests and perspectives 
of subjects, a global regulator must engage with subjects through ‘democratic’ procedures, 
such as ‘notice and comment’ and other consultation mechanisms. Third, global regulatory 
norms must be established through a process of inclusive, public reasoning, requiring the 
                                                
5 Jürgen Habermas, ‘A political constitution for the pluralist world society?’ (2007) 34 Journal of Chinese Philosophy 331. At the 
regional level, Habermas concludes that greater legislative activity would be permitted on co-ordination and collective 
action problems given the possibilities of the collective imagination of the region as a political community (drawing on the 
experiences of the European Union). 
6 See Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010); Steven Wheatley, ‘A democratic 
rule of international law’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law, 525; and Steven Wheatley, ‘A democratic account of 
the right to rule in global governance’ (2012) 18 Swiss Political Science Review 158. 
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establishment of representative, deliberative bodies. Fourth, regulatory norms must 
represent a fair bargain in terms of the interests of the various subjects of the regime. Finally, 
the likely absence of a consensus on the adoption of a regulatory norm highlights the 
importance of mechanisms of review and challenge, and the need to allow issues to be 
brought back on the agenda where new evidence or arguments are adduced. Once these 
procedural mechanisms are in place, it becomes possible for a global regulatory regime to 
develop a legitimation narrative for its exercise of normative power that allows subjects to 
regard themselves as the authors of the regime – albeit indirectly.  
 
Human rights and constitutional rights regimes  
 
One of the major contributions of the theory of deliberative democracy is that it moves us 
away from the sterile debates that position democracy and rights in an antagonistic 
relationship. For Habermas, there can be no democracy without rights, and no rights 
without democracy – his ‘co-originality’ thesis. Constitutional rights in a deliberative 
democracy take one of two forms: constitutional rights inherent in the idea of deliberative 
democracy and those that result from democratic deliberations. In the former category 
(rights inherent in deliberative democracy) are the rights to equality, membership, and 
political participation; to an effective legal remedy; and to the enjoyment of the minimum 
living conditions necessary for citizens to exercise their legal and democratic rights.7 Beyond 
these basic rights, constitutional rights are established through democratic deliberations in a 
collective act of political self-determination that aims to promote the public and private 
autonomy of citizens: private autonomy is the right to be left alone to live a life of one’s own 
choosing, public autonomy the right of public participation in the process of law-making.8 
With the exception of the basic rights necessary for the functioning of a deliberative 
democracy, constitutional rights (like all political norms) are legitimate only where they are 
agreed by subjects following a period of reasoned debate. They are not the product of some 
higher authority or natural law reasoning; constitutional rights are not discovered, or given – 
                                                
7 Habermas, above note 3, pp. 122-123. 
8 Ibid., p. 419. 
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they are agreed by the members of a political community via a process of democratic law-
making.9  
 
Whilst, at least to my mind, the model of deliberative democracy can be applied beyond the 
State to global regulatory norms (albeit imperfectly), it seems less clear that the deliberative 
ideal can be applied to human rights in world society – unless we conclude that there is 
nothing special about human rights, which can then be understood in the same way as any 
other global regulatory norms. Where Habermas has written about the possibilities of 
democracy beyond the State, the question of human rights is left unproblematized.10 
Habermas concludes, for example, that the United Nations should retain its function as 
guarantor of human rights, without examining the justification for human rights. Habermas 
abandons his co-originality thesis at the global level, removing the necessary link between 
democracy and rights: international human rights are guaranteed by global institutions, but 
not in any meaningful way subject to democratic opinion- and will-formation. The 
ontological foundation of human rights, according to Habermas, lies in the experiences of 
those democratic Nations that developed constitutional rights regimes for the protection of 
the individual:11 human rights as the globalization of constitutional rights.12 Understood in 
this way, the focus would be on domestic constitutional rights regimes, with international 
                                                
9 Rawls develops a similar argument: John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
2005). 
10 See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a 
Constitution for World Society’ (2008) 15 Constellations 444. Habermas concludes that a politically constituted world society 
would be composed of citizens and States. There would be two paths of legitimation: the first would lead from 
cosmopolitan citizens, via an international community of States, to the peace and human rights policy of the world 
organization; the second from national citizens, via the State, to a transnational negotiation system. Both paths would meet 
in the General Assembly of the world organization, which would be composed of representatives of cosmopolitan citizens 
and delegates from the democratically elected parliaments of member States. The legislative function of this ‘World 
Parliament’ would, however, be confined to the interpretation and elaboration of the Charter. 
11 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), p. 190. There is 
some evidence to support this reading, with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights being drafted with the actual 
experiences of democratic States in the protection of constitutional rights in mind. See Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made 
New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Random House New York, 2001). 
12 The idea of human rights as globalized constitutional rights is also seen in Louis Henkin, The Rights of Man Today (Boulder, 
Col.: Westview Press, 1978). 
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human rights providing a second-level backstop for the protection of rights.13 The most 
important global human right would be, in Hannah Arendt’s terms, the ‘right to have 
[constitutional] rights’, i.e. the right to belong to an organized political community and to be 
recognized as a full member of that community.14 In this context, Jean Cohen argues that the 
most serious violations of human rights (mass extermination, ethnic cleansing, massive 
crimes against humanity, including the exclusion or enslavement of one part of the 
population) can be understood in terms of radical violations of membership that indicate 
‘absolute nonbelonging’.15  
 
There is no doubt that human rights are related in some way to constitutional rights. This is 
seen in those narratives on the evolution of human rights that begin with Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen and American Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights.16 Constitutional rights 
regimes concern, however, the rights of individuals here, and necessarily distinguishes 
between insiders and outsiders, i.e. they are not cosmopolitan in outlook. Constitutional 
rights are established within a given political community, for the political community, by the 
community – they are associative rights.17 By way of contradistinction, the claims of human 
rights are grounded in the argument that human rights apply to individuals here and there: to 
count as a possible violation of human rights, the impugned action or inaction must 
constitute a violation of human rights irrespective of whether it is committed here or there.  
 
Deliberating about human rights 
 
                                                
13 See, also, the influential argument developed by Charles Beitz, which develops a two-level model of human rights, with 
States as the bearers of the primary responsibilities to respect and promote human rights and the international community 
as the guarantor of these responsibilities: Charles R. Beitz, The idea of Human Rights (OUP, 2009), p. 108.  
14 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pp. 296-7.  
15 Jean L. Cohen, ‘Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization’ (2008) 36 Political 
Theory 578, 586. 
16 For an introduction to the contested narratives of human rights, see Philip Alston, ‘Does the past matter? On the origins 
of human rights’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 2043. 
17 Cf. Thomas Nagel, ‘The problem of global justice’ (2005) 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 113, 121. 
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The requirement, then, is to establish a justification for recognizing that all individuals enjoy 
globally recognized human rights without reference to membership in a political community. 
Whilst Habermas rejects the possibility of a genuinely democratic account of human rights, 
his influence can be seen in the literature that locates the ontological foundations of human 
rights in a political or moral consensus. An argument for the deliberative legitimacy of 
human rights can, for example, be made by reference to the processes of human rights law-
making. Human rights treaties are, after all, adopted following a process of deliberation, 
argumentation, bargaining, compromise and ultimately consensus. The same point can be 
made about the treaties and the other human rights instruments adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, in which all States participate on a basis of equality. Jack 
Donnelly, for example, argues that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted by 
the UN General Assembly) should be understood an overlapping political consensus on 
human rights, which can then be explained by reference to a number of moral and political 
theories.18  
 
The idea that human rights somehow represents a consensus of political and moral thought 
has been developed by a number of writers. Charles Beitz observes that these ‘agreement 
theories’ conceptualise human rights variously in terms of the identification of rights 
common to different cultures, religions and other world views; possible agreement between 
world views on human rights; the identification of rights that it would be reasonable for 
adherents of different world views to accept; and positions that could be accepted by the 
various cultures, religions and world views, if they evolved in the direction of human rights.19 
What these agreement theories have in common is that the ontological foundation of global 
human rights is located in an actual or potential agreement (or consensus) between 
individuals on the basis of their already existing cultural, religious and other beliefs systems.  
 
Other agreement theories focus on the conditions necessary for achieving a political 
consensus on human rights, without reference to any ethical or religious outlook. The 
objective, as Joshua Cohen observes, is to establish the conditions and procedures by which 
                                                
18 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 41. 
19 Beitz, above note 13, chapter 4. 
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human rights norms can be agreed, with those rights then establishing the standards by 
which all political societies can be held accountable.20 This political conception of human 
rights is increasingly establishing itself as the dominant paradigm in the literature. Human 
rights are understood to be political in the sense that the justification given for them is 
determined by their political role in world society, i.e. in evaluating the practices of domestic 
political societies, and justifying intervention.21 Human rights are also political in the sense 
that their foundations lie in political agreement and not some metaphysical or religious 
conception of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Where political legitimacy is understood in deliberative 
terms, the legitimacy of human rights rests on the establishment of human rights norms 
through democratic procedures.  
 
Consensus, or agreement, is of course central to the deliberative model of political legitimacy 
– the idea being that it is not possible, ceteris paribus, for an individual to suffer an injustice 
where they have consented to the relevant act or conduct. Writers argue variously that the 
legitimate authority of human rights can be established in the agreement of political 
communities to uphold human rights or, more radically, in the consent of each individual to 
the global human rights system that gives meaning to the contingent and contested idea of 
‘being human’ (this later variant is clearly focused on hypothetical consent). Other writers 
have sought to locate the basis for human rights in different aspects of the deliberative ideal. 
A particular focus has been public justification.22 Rainer Forst, for example, refers to a basic 
human right to justification, which is framed in terms that an individual cannot be treated in 
a manner ‘for which adequate reasons cannot be provided.’23 The premise is that no one can 
                                                
20 Joshua Cohen, ‘Minimalism about human rights: The most we can hope for?’ (2004) 12 Journal of Political Philosophy 190, 
195-7. 
21 Kenneth Baynes, ‘Discourse Ethics and the Political Conception of Human Rights’ (2009) 2 (1) Ethics & Global Politics 1, 
7. See also Laura Valentini, ‘In What Sense are Human Rights Political? A Preliminary Exploration’ (2012) 60 Political Studies 
180.  
22 Amartya Sen, for example, argues that the ethical idea of human rights includes an implicit presumption that any 
justifiable conception can sustain open and informed scrutiny as to which rights should be included and which rights should 
not be included in any list of human rights: Amartya Sen, The idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 359. In similar 
vein, Robert Alexy concludes that human rights ‘are valid if and only if they are justifiable’: Robert Alexy, ‘Law, Morality, 
and the Existence of Human Rights’ (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 2, 10. 
23 Rainer Forst, ‘The Basic Right to Justification: Towards a Constructivist Conception of Human Rights’ (1999) 6 
Constellations 35, 40. 
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speak for, or decide on behalf of, another. Consequently, it is not possible to construct a 
body of human rights law, unless that law can be justified to each individual to which it is 
applied.24 Likewise, Seyla Benhabib argues that the project of human rights, as a project of 
juridical universalism, ‘presupposes recourse to justificatory universalism.’25 Given that human 
rights does not have an objective, taken-for-granted, content or meaning, it must be 
developed through public debate and deliberation, as rights claims are ‘contested and 
contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and political 
institutions’.26 The contention is that each individual is entitled to equal moral respect – and 
as having the ability to make and understand arguments around human rights, and to accept 
or reject the arguments of others. 
 
Dissensus accounts of human rights 
 
Underlying the arguments of the various deliberative or agreement scholars – all influenced 
in some way by Habermas,27 is the idea that, in the absence of an agreed religious, 
metaphysical or philosophical basis, the ontological foundation of human rights should be 
located in an actual or hypothetical consensus on global human rights system. Where new 
rights or new interpretations are proposed, the requirement then is to engage in a process of 
reasoned deliberations in order to achieved a revised consensus. The problem for 
deliberative accounts is that the objective of human rights is often not to establish agreement 
on the basis of reasoned argument, but to frame a politics of dissensus around which human 
rights campaigns can organize themselves.28 Consider, for example, the ways in which the 
social movements on slavery, racism, gender discrimination, discrimination on the grounds 
                                                
24 Rainer Forst, ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach’ (2010) 120 
Ethics 711, 740. 
25 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Another Universalism: On the Unity and Diversity of Human Rights’ (2007) 81 (2) Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 7, 13 (emphasis in original).  
26 Ibid., 21.  
27 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour identifies deliberative or agreement scholars (who understand human rights as ‘agreed’) as one 
of four Schools of human rights: Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Who believes in human rights? Reflections on the European Convention 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapter 8. Along with the deliberative scholars, Dembour identifies natural 
human rights scholars (human rights as ‘given’); protest scholars (human rights as ‘fought for’); and discourse scholars 
(human rights as ‘talked about’). 
28 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 2007), p. 94. 
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of sexuality, State-sponsored torture and killing were framed against political power and often 
sought to breakdown a political consensus, and in doing so to increase political instability – in 
contradistinction to the arguments from deliberative democracy.  
 
In their everyday use, human rights are not propositions about philosophical truths. Those 
campaigning in support of this-or-that human right do not often consider themselves to be 
engaged in a process of moral reasoning. The language and rhetoric of human rights 
normally arises in response to a perceived injustice – a particular act of police brutality, for 
example, when campaigners seek to name the impugned act or omission a human rights 
injustice by reference to a globally recognized norm. This is explained by Alison Brysk in 
terms of ‘speaking rights to power.’29 Brysk argues that a human rights politics of persuasion 
operates through narrating the concrete suffering of individuals. By caring about the fate 
others, we learn what it means to be human: ‘[b]y telling me who is human, the social 
imaginary of human rights reflects back my own humanity’.30 Of course, as Jean-François 
Lyotard observes, the paradox of human rights is that rights follow situations of not being 
treated like a fellow human, i.e. to be treated other than a human – only then does an 
individual have rights, and only then are they treated by others as a human being.31  
 
Human rights against the system 
 
The paradigmatic infraction of human rights involves a violation of the physical integrity of a 
member of an Opposition political party by agents of the State. Thomas Pogge highlights the 
connection between human rights and the actions of officials, giving the example of the 
theft of a car: if the car is stolen by an ordinary thief, this is not normally considered a 
violation of human rights; whereas, if the car is arbitrarily confiscated by a government 
official, this is often understood as a violation of the right to property.32 We know this is a 
                                                
29 Alison Brysk, Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 16. 
30 Ibid., p. 25. 
31 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘The Other’s Rights’, in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights (The Oxford 
Amnesty Lectures, 1993) 135, 136.  
32 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights : Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity 2008), p. 
63. Following this line of thought, James Nickel develops a prudential argument for individuals to support human rights on 
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human rights violation because it concerns the abuse of power by a government institution. 
How, though, do we explain this? Gunther Teubner argues that, since Niccolò Machiavelli, 
politics has become detached from morality and religion. Understood as the use of coercive 
power within a territory to carry out collectively biding decisions, politics has developed its 
own specialised language and rationality. The politics system has a tendency, however, to 
totalise its rationality in one of two ways. First, it seeks to regulate all aspects of social life, 
including the law, the economy, religion and science, etc. Secondly, the politics system seeks 
to control the minds and bodies of individuals, interfering in what we might call private 
autonomy. Teubner observes that, through its functioning, the politics system creates its 
own understanding of the world that includes its conception of the value (or otherwise) of 
those individuals subject to the system, and it can easily ‘turn against [those individuals, or 
some sub-set, thereof] and threaten their integrity, or even terminate their existence.’33  
 
Whilst the idea that the function of human rights is to protect the individual from the 
government is common in the literature, it is an error to understand human rights only in 
terms of limiting political power. Consider, for example, the human right prohibiting slavery. 
Slavery results from the functioning of the economic system, where it develops a rationale 
that categorizes certain individuals as possessions to be bought and sold for money in an 
open market, with the objective being to make a profit. It makes no difference to the 
economic system whether slavery is regarded as morally right or wrong by others, whose 
opinions are not part of the system’s thinking. The argument against slavery must be made 
against both the economic system – demanding that it change its way of thinking about 
certain individuals – and against the politics system – calling on the later to intervene in the 
economic system and utilize political power through the medium of law to protect 
individuals.  
 
The example of slavery makes clear that human rights cannot be understood exclusively in 
terms of rights against the politics system, but against the ways in which social systems 
                                                
the basis that rights protect fundamental interests against the threats presented by governments: James W. Nickel, Making 
sense of human rights, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Pub. 2007), p. 55. 
33 Gunther Teubner, ‘The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors’ (2006) 69 The 
Modern Law Review 327, 335. 
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function – the politics systems, the economy, the media, religion, etc. The analysis draws on 
the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann, which understands world society in terms of 
communication systems that have their own irreconcilable rationalities: the rationalities of 
law, politics, economics and sciences, etc. Systems of communication are distinguished from 
the background noise of world society by virtue of the fact that each system has its own 
functional specialism and its own binary coding, through which the system creates its own 
understanding of the world according to the rationalities of the particular system-type.34 
Each system generates its own understanding of the world from a point-of-view that is 
internal to the system. The only relevant perspective is that of the system, and the only 
relevant observer is the system. Luhmann’s autopoietic systems are closed systems. The 
theory excludes the possibility of information entering a social system directly from the 
environment, or from another system. A closed, autopoietic system can only understand the 
information it receives from the external environment in terms of ‘irritations, surprises, and 
disturbances’.35 It then makes sense of these irritations to restructure the system, consistent 
with its previous operations. Where there are repeated irritations from the environment that 
the system comes to rely upon, the system is said to be coupled structurally with an aspect of 
the environment, including the possibility of structural coupling with another system. The 
idea of structural coupling was developed by Luhmann in his later writings to explain how a 
system can maintain its autonomy, whilst evolving with developments in the external 
environment, including developments in other systems.  
 
Law and politics are, according to Luhmann, autopoietic systems of communication. The 
functional specialism of law is to maintain expectations in the face of disappointment. The 
binary coding is lawful/unlawful, or law/non-law. The function of the politics system is to 
provide society with a means of making (collectively) binding decisions on political 
questions. The binary coding is governing/governed, or authority/subject. The politics 
system is comprised of communications on those issues identified as requiring the adoption 
of collectively binding decisions that will be coercively enforced. The politics system 
exercises coercive power through the legal system: politics establishes the scope of effective 
                                                
34 See, generally, Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, Vols. 1 & 2, translated by Rhodes Barrett (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2012 & 2013).  
35 Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans. Klaus Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 383. 
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law norms through executive enforcement; law translates power into legitimate political 
action. Luhmann understands the systems of law and politics to be coupled structurally 
under a Constitution, which is constructed by each system separately, but which assists each 
system to make sense of its relationship with the other.36 The idea of constitutional rights in 
closed systems theory is explained by reference to this structural coupling. Constitutional 
rights emerge through the interactions of the coupled systems of law and politics in the form 
of a Bill of Rights, which is one part of the State Constitution.37 Fundamental (constitutional) 
rights operate in the following ways: to resist the totalizing claims of the politics system (the 
dystopia of the totalitarian State); to demand action from the politics system to protect the 
interests of subjects (the dystopia of the failed State); to protect individuals from the 
totalizing claims of other systems (media, religion, economy, etc.); and to ensure the 
recognition and inclusion of all individuals within the political system and the other 
communication systems of society (the economic system, etc.). 
 
Self-constraint: the most we can hope for? 
 
Luhmann understands world society as a system of autopoietic systems of communication that 
build themselves from their own communications and which then constitutes the 
possibilities of future communications. There is no reason to exclude the possibility of global 
constitutional rights emerging as the result of the structural coupling of global law and global 
politics – indeed, Luhmann sees the emergence of human rights, as the result of 
scandalization following State-sponsored disappearances, killings and torture, as an 
important indicator of the existence of a global law system.38 These global constitutional 
                                                
36 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure And Structural Coupling: The Differentiation Of The Legal System’ (1991-2) 13 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1419, 1436. Whilst the legal and political systems are coevolved and coexistent, they can only make sense of 
the world in their own terms, even when they are communicating about the same subject: for the legal system, legislation 
adopted by the national Parliament is to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the principles concerning statutory 
interpretation; for the political system, legislation is an expression of a collective binding decision that should be given 
effect. 
37 Luhmann, above note 35, p. 417. See further Gert Verschraegen, ‘Human Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological 
Analysis from the Perspective of Systems Theory’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 258. 
38 Ibid., p. 482. For a critique of Luhmann’s approach, see Gunther Teubner, ‘Transnational Fundamental Rights: 
Horizontal Effect?’ (2011) 40 Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 191, 194-5. 
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rights would not, however, impose an external constraint on other social systems – including 
the systems of domestic law and politics.39 In the closed systems theory of autopoiesis, 
human rights can only operate as a form of internal critique: they cannot establish ‘external’ 
limits on system functioning. In Luhmann’s words, there is no ‘moral super-code’ in closed 
systems theory.40 The immorality of system function can only be understood by reference to 
the non-functioning of the system, i.e. when a system fails to operate in accordance with its 
own programme and code – corruption in politics is ‘wrong’, doping in sport is ‘wrong’, etc. 
From the perspective of autopoiesis, the justice claims of human rights can only be aimed at 
removing unjust situations, not creating justice, as the system responds to the irritations felt 
by the system at the point of contact with individuals complaining about violations of their 
physical and psychological integrity. The argument is one of self-limitation: it is for the 
system to decides how to respond to the irritations it feels following ‘injustices’ committed 
against flesh and blood individuals. Consider, for example, the way in which Gunther 
Teubner explains the emergence of global human rights in the aftermath of the World War 
II as a moment at which ‘political power throughout the world was prepared to constrain itself.’41  
 
But why would political power constrain itself, and how could political power constrain itself 
within the existing rationale of the system? The question applies equally to other systems, 
including the (global) economic system.42 It is not sufficient only to develop a conception of 
human rights as an internal critique of system rationale, i.e. to leave it to each system to 
decide whether – and to what extent – it develops its own conception of ‘human rights’. It 
must also be possible for those outside of a system, including those put outside of the 
system, to directly challenge the way in which a system is functioning, whether that be the 
politics system, law system, or economics system, etc. In a significant divergence from earlier 
work, Luhmann’s later publications identify a meta-code of inclusion/exclusion. This meta-
                                                
39 At one point Luhmann asserts, without explication, that ‘international public law… binds domestic law’: ibid., p. 369. If 
this were the case, then it would be difficult to regard State-law as an autopoietic, autonomous, closed system of 
communication (as Luhmann does). 
40 Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, Vol. 2, translated by Rhodes Barrett (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 281. 
41 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, translated by Gareth Norbury (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 83 (emphasis added). 
42 See Emilios Christodoulidis, ‘On the Politics of Societal Constitutionalism’ (2013) 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
629. 
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code, he explains, is inherent in the idea of closed systems theory, as each system presumes 
to create a world of meaning for all individuals in relation to its own function, but only its 
function – the law system, for example, establishes the way in which individuals experience 
‘the law’, but only the law. The very operation of the system results, however, in some 
individuals being excluded from full participation in the system – as a direct consequence of 
the way the system functions: individuals are either included within the system (as citizens 
within the politics system, for example) or excluded (slaves within the economic system). 
Inclusion from one system is likely to lead to exclusion from another. The exclusion from 
the politics system (and status of citizen) is likely, for example, to lead to exclusion from full 
participation on the economic system (as in the case of undocumented migrants). The meta-
coding inclusion/exclusion reflects the fact that some human beings will be, in Luhmann 
terms, ‘persons and others only individuals [or bodies]; that some are included into function 
systems… and others are excluded from these systems’.43  
 
Is clear from Luhmann’s analysis, that he regards it as morally ‘wrong’ for certain individuals 
to be excluded from participation in social systems (the economy, politics, education etc.) 
that – in his opinion – they should be included in. Luhmann is not personally content to 
accept that the rationale of the particular system (politics, the economy, the media, etc,) 
legitimates itself through system functioning – and that the legitimation narrative should be 
accepted by all subjects (and non-subjects) and all observers of the system. Whilst Luhmann 
does not, in this context, refer to the idea of human rights, his concerns reflect one of the 
foundational meta-principles of human rights – that each individual counts equally simply 
‘by virtue of being human’, irrespective of system rationale.  
 
Whilst the closed systems theory of autopoiesis excludes the possibility of human rights 
directly influencing the law and politics systems (other variants of systems theory allow for a 
more nuanced account), it is evident that human rights constitutes a massive irritant to the law 
and politics systems when it highlights the exclusion of individuals who should have been 
included in a social system and observes violations of their physical and psychological 
                                                
43 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Globalization or World society: How to conceive of modern society?’ (1997) 7 International Review of 
Sociology 67, 76. 
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integrity as a consequence of the operations of a system. Where systems understand 
themselves to be closed, self producing, systems, they can only understand human suffering 
by constructing a mask that represents the pain of the individual.44 Behind that mask, 
however, is the face of a flesh and blood individual that demands inclusion in the system and 
complains of violations of her physical and psychological integrity. The idea of humanity is 
represented in that face and in its suffering: in the face of the unknown man stood in front 
of a tank in Tiananmen Square or that of the emaciated individual behind the fence of a 
concentration camp.45 Those faces serve as a reminder of the value of the human individual 
against the self-serving expansionist tendencies of system rationale – especially that of the 




When we talk about human rights, we might mean one of three things: moral human rights – 
an ethical argument that we have rights, for this or that reason, simply by virtue of being 
human; political human rights, represented inter alia by the standard setting and 
interventionist practices of the political bodies of the United Nations; and legal human 
rights, reflected, for example, in the UN human rights treaties. The global human rights 
system can be modelled as the system of these (human rights) systems. The global human 
rights system frames our understanding of what it means to be human – or at least what it 
means not to be human – when it observes that it is ‘wrong’ (morally, legally, politically, or in 
some other way) to treat an individual in a particular way. Parts of the system are amenable 
to an application of the deliberative methodology: the texts of human rights treaties are 
agreed following deliberation and negotiation, and adopted by consensus; the political 
dimensions of human rights – discussions on the need for new rights or justifications for 
intervention – are often the subject of reasoned debate at the United Nations; and it is 
possibility to identify a consensus on the meaning of human rights within and between many 
of the world’s cultures, or to develop a thought experiment in which human rights can be 
                                                
44 See, for example, Teubner, above note 41, p. 142. 
45 Cf. Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: Hart, 2000), p. 245. 
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justified to all individuals by all individuals. It would though be an error to seek to locate the 
ontological foundations of human rights in the deliberative ideal.  
 
Habermas’ model of democracy establishes a compelling argument for the way in which 
governmental and governance regimes within and beyond the State should understand their 
claim to legitimate political authority. It also provides a coherent account of constitutional 
rights – rights inherent in the practice of democracy and those that result from political 
deliberations. Deliberative democracy is, though, a counterfactual ideal, observing the 
possibilities of a never to be realized utopia of justice yet to come. This must be contrasted 
with the language of human rights, which reflects the dark and depressing reality of a lived 
dystopia for many individuals.46 The language of human rights is the language of dissent to 
the realities that functional systems (politics, the economy, etc.) can, and do, exclude 
individuals from full participation (slaves, women, minorities, etc.) and that they can, and do, 
turn against individuals, violating their bodily integrity or rendering them non-persons 
through significant restrictions on those aspects of human social life that make us human. 
Human rights is primarily the language of emotion, upset, anger and disagreement – and 
those using the language of human rights are not always predisposed to engage in a 
reasonable way with the rationales of the functional systems of politics, economics, etc. to 
explain why torture is wrong, slavery is wrong, etc. For this reason alone, deliberative ideas 
cannot establish the ontological foundations of human rights, even if they can provide a 
methodology by which we can agree on their positivization in law. The global human rights 
system must allow for the articulation of moral outrage and the breaking open of political 
consensus.  
 
Susan Sontag observes that framing something as a human right, shifts our understanding of 
suffering beyond a mistake, or an accident, or crime: instead it becomes ‘something to be 
                                                
46 Gordin observes that, whilst utopias takes us into the future, dystopia bears the hallmark of lived experience, placing us 
‘directly in a dark and depressing reality’: Michael D. Gordin, et al., ‘Utopia and Dystopia beyond Space and Time’, in 
Michael D. Gordin, et al. (eds.) Utopia/Dystopia : Conditions Of Historical Possibility (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton 
University Press 2010) 1, 2. 
 19 
fixed’.47 Human rights is concerned with universal conceptions of avoidable human 
suffering. It is the language in which communication systems (law, politics, economics, the 
media, etc.) and outsiders are reminded that individuals count against the rationale of system 
functioning – and that they count simply ‘by virtue of being human’ (nothing more is 
required). This idea of ‘being human’ is, though, both contingent and contestable. It starts 
with an emotional response to a concrete situation of perceived injustice observed in the face 
of each and every individual that suffers as the result of their exclusion from a social system 
or through the violation of their physical or physiological integrity as a result of the way in 
which the system functions. When a claim is recognized as a human rights violation, it 
contributes to our understanding of human rights – and what it means to be human. It is in 
that constructed and contested value of the individual, which emerges in the face of the 
victims of avoidable suffering, that we establish the ontological foundations of human rights.  
 
The foundations of human rights are not, then, reason and logic. When we deliberate about 
what it means to be human in rational and reasonable terms, we are reflecting on the 
importance of each and every individual. The language of human rights is primarily an 
intuitive, emotional response (including empathy, upset and anger) to avoidable human 
suffering. It can be expressed in Anglo-Saxon terms of ‘That’s just fucking wrong!” In order 
to count as a human right, the observation of ‘wrongness’ must either resonate with a 
globally recognized human right or shape the emergence of a new right or new 
understanding of an existing right. Conversations around human rights contain an express or 
implied reference to the meaning of ‘being human’ (or, more accurately, not being human): 
an impugned act or omission constitutes a violation of human rights only if it would amount 
to a violation when committed against any individual in the same circumstances. The 
contingent and contested device of the human face allows for a global (cosmopolitan) 
conversation about this idea of ‘being human’, providing a conceptual space in which 
discussions on the moral value of the human person can be developed, but there is no 
requirement that it develops in accordance with a deliberative methodology. Dissensus, i.e. 
widespread dissent and disagreement, as to the way in which a social system is functioning, 
                                                
47 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2003), p. 99, quoted Brysk, above note 29, 
p. 26. 
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not consensus, provides the starting point for identifying the ontological foundations of the 
cosmopolitan idea of ‘human rights’. 
